DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON, AND SEEKING TRUTH IN
THE SCIENCES
by Rene Descartes
PREFATORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR
If this Discourse appear too long
to be read at once, it may be divided into six Parts:
and, in the first, will be found various considerations touching the
Sciences; in the second, the principal rules of the Method which the Author has
discovered, in the third, certain of the rules of Morals which he has deduced
from this Method; in the fourth, the reasonings by which he establishes the
existence of God and of the Human Soul, which are the
foundations of his Metaphysic; in the
fifth, the order of the Physical questions which he has investigated, and, in
particular, the explication of the motion of the heart and of some other
difficulties pertaining to Medicine, as also the difference between the soul of
man and that of the brutes; and, in the last, what the Author believes to be
required in order to greater advancement in the investigation of Nature than has
yet been made, with the reasons that have induced him to write.
PART 1
Good sense is, of all things
among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so
abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to
satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this
quality than they already possess.
And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to
be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing
truth from error, which is properly what is called
good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the
diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed
with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct
our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same
objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime
requisite is rightly to apply it.
The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open
likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet
make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than
those who, while they run, forsake it.
For myself, I have never fancied
my mind to be in any respect more perfect than those of the generality; on the
contrary, I have often wished that I were equal to some others in promptitude of
thought, or in clearness and distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and
readiness of memory. And besides
these, I know of no other qualities that contribute to the perfection of the
mind; for as to the reason or sense, inasmuch as it is
that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us
from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in
each individual; and on this point to adopt the common opinion of philosophers,
who say that the difference of greater and less holds only among the accidents,
and not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same
species.
I will not hesitate, however, to
avow my belief that it has been my singular good
fortune to have very early in life fallen in with certain tracks which
have conducted me to considerations and maxims, of which I have formed a method
that gives me the means, as I think, of gradually augmenting my knowledge, and
of raising it by little and little to the
highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the
brief duration of my life will permit me to reach.
For I have already reaped from it such fruits that, although I have been
accustomed to think lowly enough of myself, and although when I look with the
eye of a philosopher at the varied courses and pursuits of mankind at large, I
find scarcely one which does not appear in vain and useless, I nevertheless
derive the highest satisfaction from the progress I conceive myself to have
already made in the search after truth, and cannot help entertaining such
expectations of the future as to believe that if, among the occupations of men
as men, there is any one really excellent and important, it is that which I have
chosen.
After all, it is possible I may
be mistaken; and it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for
gold and diamonds. I know how very
liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and also how much the
judgments of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favor.
But I shall endeavor in this discourse to describe the paths I have
followed, and to delineate my life as in a picture, in order that each one may
also be able to judge of them for himself, and that in the general opinion
entertained of them, as gathered from current report, I myself may have a new
help towards instruction to be added to those I have been in the habit of
employing.
My present design, then, is not
to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his
reason, but solely to describe the way in which I have endeavored to conduct my
own. They who set themselves to
give precepts must of course regard themselves as possessed of greater skill
than those to whom they prescribe; and if they err in the slightest particular,
they subject themselves to censure.
But as this tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale,
in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps,
as many more which it were
advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful to
some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favor
with all.
From my childhood, I have been
familiar with letters; and as I was given to believe that by their help a clear
and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life might be acquired, I was
ardently desirous of instruction.
But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close of which
it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I completely
changed my opinion. For I found
myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had
advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every
turn of my own ignorance. And yet I
was studying in one of the most celebrated schools in
I still continued, however, to
hold in esteem the studies of the schools. I was aware that the languages taught
in them are necessary to the understanding of the writings of the ancients; that
the grace of fable stirs the mind; that the memorable deeds of history elevate
it; and, if read with discretion, aid in forming the judgment; that the perusal
of all excellent books is, as it
were, to interview with the noblest men of past ages, who have written them, and
even a studied interview, in which are discovered to us only their choicest
thoughts; that eloquence has incomparable force and beauty; that poesy has its
ravishing graces and delights; that in the mathematics there are many refined
discoveries
eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive, as well as
further all the arts an lessen the labour of man; that numerous highly useful
precepts and exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on morals; that
theology points out the path to heaven; that philosophy affords the means of
discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters, and commands the
admiration of the more simple; that jurisprudence, medicine, and the other
sciences, secure for their cultivators honors and riches; and, in fine, that it
is useful to bestow some attention upon all, even upon those abounding the most
in superstition and error, that we may be in a position to determine their real
value, and guard against being deceived.
But I believed that I had already
given sufficient time to languages, and likewise to the reading of the writings
of the ancients, to their histories and fables.
For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel, are almost
the same thing. It is useful to
know something of the manners of different nations, that we may be enabled
to form a more correct judgment regarding our own, and be prevented from
thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous and irrational, a
conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has been limited to their
own country. On the other hand,
when too much time is occupied in traveling, we become strangers to our native
country; and the over curious in the customs of the past are generally ignorant
of those of the present. Besides,
fictitious narratives lead us to imagine the possibility of many events that are
impossible; and even the most faithful histories, if they do not wholly
misrepresent matters, or exaggerate their importance to render the account of
them more worthy of perusal, omit, at least, almost always the meanest and least
striking of the attendant circumstances; hence it happens that the remainder
does not represent the truth, and that such as regulate their conduct by
examples drawn from this source, are apt to fall into the extravagances of the
knight-errants of romance, and to entertain projects that exceed their powers.
I esteemed eloquence highly, and
was in raptures with poesy; but I thought that both were gifts of nature rather
than fruits of study. Those in whom
the faculty of reason is predominant, and who most skillfully dispose their
thoughts with a view to render them clear and intelligible, are always the best
able to persuade others of the truth of what they lay down, though they should
speak only in the language of Lower Brittany, and be wholly ignorant of the
rules of rhetoric; and those whose minds are stored with the most agreeable
fancies, and who can give expression to them with the greatest embellishment and
harmony, are still the best poets, though unacquainted with the art of poetry.
I was especially delighted with
the mathematics, on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings;
but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that
they but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished
that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier superstructure
reared on them. On the other hand,
I compared the disquisitions of the ancient moralists to very towering and
magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud:
they laud the virtues very highly, and exhibit them as estimable far
above anything on earth; but they give us no adequate criterion of virtue, and
frequently that which they designate with so fine a name is but apathy, or
pride, or despair, or parricide.
I revered our theology, and
aspired as much as any one to reach heaven:
but being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to
the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which
lead to heaven are above our comprehension, I did not presume to subject them to
the impotency of my reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake
their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of being
more than man.
Of philosophy I will say nothing,
except that when I saw that it had been cultivated for many ages by the most
distinguished men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere
which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is above doubt, I
did not presume to anticipate that my success would be greater in it than that
of others; and further, when I considered the number of conflicting opinions
touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be
but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable.
As to the other sciences,
inasmuch as these borrow their principles from philosophy, I judged that no
solid superstructures could be reared on foundations so infirm; and neither the
honor nor the gain held out by them was sufficient to determine me to their
cultivation: for I was not, thank
Heaven, in a condition which compelled me to make merchandise of science for the
bettering of my fortune; and though I might not profess to scorn glory as a
cynic, I yet made very slight account of that honor which I
hoped to acquire only through fictitious titles.
And, in fine, of false sciences I thought I knew the worth sufficiently
to escape being deceived by the professions of an alchemist, the predictions of
an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, or by the artifices and boasting of
any of those who profess to know things of which they are ignorant.
For these reasons, as soon as my
age permitted me to pass from under the control of my instructors, I entirely
abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science
than the knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world.
I spent the remainder of my youth in traveling, in visiting courts and
armies, in holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in
collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into
which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter
of my experience as to secure my improvement.
For it occurred to me that I should find much more truth in the
reasonings of each individual with reference to the affairs in which he is
personally interested, and the issue of which must presently punish him if he
has judged amiss, than in those conducted by a man of letters in his study,
regarding speculative matters that are of no practical moment, and followed by
no consequences to himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster his vanity
the better the more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as they must
in this case, the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable.
In addition, I had always a most earnest desire to know how to
distinguish the true from the false, in order that I might be able clearly to
discriminate the right path in life, and proceed in it with confidence.
It is true that, while busied
only in considering the manners of other men, I found here, too, scarce any
ground for settled conviction, and remarked hardly less contradiction among them
than in the opinions of the philosophers.
So that the greatest advantage I derived from the study consisted in
this, that, observing many things which, however extravagant and ridiculous to
our apprehension, are yet by common consent received and approved by other great
nations, I learned to entertain too decided a belief in regard to nothing of the
truth of which I had been persuaded merely by example and custom; and thus I
gradually extricated myself from many errors powerful enough to darken our
natural intelligence, and incapacitate us in great measure from listening to
reason. But after I had been
occupied several years in thus studying the book of the world, and in essaying
to gather some experience, I at length resolved to make myself an object of
study, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I ought to
follow, an undertaking which was accompanied with greater success than it would
have been had I never quitted my country or my books.
PART II
I was then in Germany, attracted
thither by the wars in that country, which have not yet been brought to a
termination; and as I was returning to the army from the coronation of the
emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a locality where, as I found no
society to interest me, and was besides fortunately undisturbed by any cares or
passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy
my attention with my own thoughts.
Of these one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so
much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different
hands had been employed, as in those completed by a single master.
Thus it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has
planned and executed, are generally more elegant and commodious than those which
several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for
which they were not originally built.
Thus also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only villages,
have become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill laid out
compared with the regularity constructed towns which a professional architect
has freely planned on an open plain; so that although the several buildings of
the former may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter, yet when
one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a large one and here a
small, and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets, one is
disposed to allege that chance rather than any human will guided by reason must
have led to such an arrangement.
And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all times certain
officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings contributed to public
ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with but the materials of
others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged.
In the same way I fancied that those nations which, starting from a
semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilization by slow degrees, have had
their laws successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply by
experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this
process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those which, from
the commencement of their association as communities, have followed the
appointments of some wise legislator.
It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the true religion, the
ordinances of which are derived from God, must be incomparably superior to that
of every other. And, to speak of
human affairs, I believe that the pre-eminence of Sparta was due not to the
goodness of each of its laws in particular, for many of these were very strange,
and even opposed to good morals, but to the circumstance that, originated by a
single individual, they all tended to a single end.
In the same way I thought that the sciences contained in books (such of
them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstrations),
composed as they are of the opinions of many different individuals massed
together, are farther removed from truth than the simple inferences which a man
of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting the
matters of his experience. And
because we have all to pass through a state of infancy to manhood, and have been
of necessity, for a length of time, governed by our desires and preceptors
(whose dictates were frequently conflicting, while neither perhaps always
counseled us for the best), I farther concluded that it is almost impossible
that our judgments can be so correct or solid as they would have been, had our
reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and had we always been guided
by it alone.
It is true, however, that it is
not customary to pull down all the houses of a town with the single design of
rebuilding them differently, and thereby rendering the streets more handsome;
but it often happens that a private individual takes down his own with the view
of erecting it anew, and that people are even sometimes constrained to this when
their houses are in danger of falling from age, or when the foundations are
insecure. With this before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would
indeed be preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state by
fundamentally changing it throughout, and overturning it in order to set it up
amended; and the same I thought was true of any similar project for reforming
the body of the sciences, or the order of teaching them established in the
schools: but as for the opinions
which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do better than
resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards be in a
position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they
had undergone the scrutiny of reason.
I firmly believed that in this way I should much better succeed in the
conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leaned upon
principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust.
For, although I recognized
various difficulties in this undertaking, these were not, however, without
remedy, nor once to be compared with such as attend the slightest reformation in
public affairs. Large bodies, if
once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept erect when
once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is always disastrous.
Then if there are any imperfections in the constitutions of states (and
that many such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to
assure us), custom has without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniences,
and has even managed to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a
number which sagacity could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in
fine, the defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for
their removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by
being much frequented, become gradually so smooth and commodious, that it is
much better to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the
tops of rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.
Hence it is that I cannot in any
degree approve of those restless and busy meddlers who, called neither by birth
nor fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always
projecting reforms; and if I thought that this tract contained aught which might
justify the suspicion that I was a victim of such folly, I would by no means
permit its publication. I have
never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions, and
basing them on a foundation wholly my own.
And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to present here
a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore recommend to every one else to
make a similar attempt. Those whom
God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs
still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present
undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate.
The single design to strip one's self of all past beliefs is one that
ought not to be taken by every one.
The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this
be at all a befitting resolution:
in the first place, of those who with more than a due confidence in their own
powers, are precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for
orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if men of this class
once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten
highway, they will never be able to thread the byway that would lead them by a
shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for life; in the
second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to
determine that there are others who excel them in the power of discriminating
between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed, ought rather to
content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to
their own reason.
For my own part, I should
doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I received instruction from but
one master, or had I never known the diversities of opinion that from time
immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest learning.
But I had become aware, even so early as during my college life, that no
opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been
maintained by some one of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my
travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours
are not in that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that many of
these nations make an equally good, if not better, use of their reason than we
do. I took into account also the
very different character which a person brought up from infancy in France or
Germany exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this
individual would have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese or with
savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us
ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favor before ten
years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous.
I was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more
custom and example than any certain knowledge.
And, finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked
that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of
difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be
found by one than by many. I could,
however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of
preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my own
reason in the conduct of my life.
But like one walking alone and in
the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and with such circumspection, that if
I did not advance far, I would at least guard against falling.
I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions that had
crept into my belief without having been introduced by reason, but first of all
took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the
task I was setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at
the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.
Among the branches of philosophy,
I had, at an earlier period, given some attention to logic, and among those of
the mathematics to geometrical analysis and algebra, -- three arts or sciences
which ought, as I conceived, to contribute something to my design.
But, on examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the
majority of its other precepts are of avail-- rather in the communication of
what we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without judgment
of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown;
and although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent
precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or
superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to
effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a
Minerva from a rough block of marble.
Then as to the analysis of the
ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides that they embrace only matters
highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former is so exclusively
restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can exercise the
understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination; and, in
the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas,
that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to
embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind.
By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which
would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects.
And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state is
best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like
manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I
believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me,
provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to
fail in observing them.
The first was never to accept
anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say,
carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in
my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to
exclude all ground of doubt.
The second, to divide each of the
difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be
necessary for its adequate solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts
in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know,
I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the
knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to
those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of
antecedence and sequence.
And the last, in every case to
make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured
that nothing was omitted.
The long chains of simple and
easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the
conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that
all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected
in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be
beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we
abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our
thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another.
And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was
necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the
simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have
hitherto sought truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able
to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not
doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations.
I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest
objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to
be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a
distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound.
But I had no intention on that account of attempting to master all the
particular sciences commonly denominated mathematics:
but observing that, however different their objects, they all agree in
considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting among those
objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these proportions in the
most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular,
except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of them, and without by any
means restricting them to these, that afterwards I might thus be the better able
to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately
applicable. Perceiving further,
that in order to understand these relations I should sometimes have to consider
them one by one and sometimes only to bear them in mind, or embrace them in the
aggregate, I thought that, in order the better to consider them individually, I
should view them as subsisting between straight lines, than which I could find
no objects more simple, or capable of being more distinctly represented to my
imagination and senses; and on the other hand, that in order to retain them in
the memory or embrace an aggregate of many, I should express them by certain
characters the briefest possible.
In this way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in geometrical
analysis and in algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by help of the
other.
And, in point of fact, the
accurate observance of these few precepts gave me, I take the liberty of saying,
such ease in unraveling all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that
in the two or three months I devoted to their examination, not only did I reach
solutions of questions I had formerly deemed exceedingly difficult but even as
regards questions of the solution of which I continued ignorant, I was enabled,
as it appeared to me, to determine the means whereby, and the extent to which a
solution was possible; results attributable to the circumstance that I commenced
with the simplest and most general truths, and that thus each truth discovered
was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones.
Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain, if it be considered that, as
the truth on any particular point is one whoever apprehends the truth, knows all
that on that point can be known.
The child, for example, who has been instructed in the elements of
arithmetic, and has made a particular addition, according to rule, may be
assured that he has found, with respect to the sum of the numbers before him,
and that in this instance is within the reach of human genius.
Now, in conclusion, the method which teaches adherence to the true order,
and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing sought includes all
that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic.
But the chief ground of my
satisfaction with this method, was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my
reason in all matters, if not with absolute perfection, at least with the
greatest attainable by me: besides,
I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to
clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped also, from not
having restricted this method to any particular matter, to apply it to the
difficulties of the other sciences, with not less success than to those of
algebra. I should not, however, on
this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of
the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been contrary
to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the knowledge of such
is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in which I found nothing
certain, I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish its
principles. .And because I
observed, besides, that an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the
greatest moment, and one in which precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were
most to be dreaded, I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached
a more mature age (being at that time but twenty-three), and had first of all
employed much of my time in preparation for the work, as well by eradicating
from my mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted, as by
amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings, and by
continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to increased skill
in its application.
PART III
And finally, as it is not enough,
before commencing to rebuild the house in which we live, that it be pulled down,
and materials and builders provided, or that we engage in the work ourselves,
according to a plan which we have beforehand carefully drawn out, but as it is
likewise necessary that we be furnished with some other house in which we may
live commodiously during the operations, so that I might not remain irresolute
in my actions, while my reason compelled me to suspend my judgment, and that I
might not be prevented from living thenceforward in the greatest possible
felicity, I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims,
with which I am desirous to make you acquainted.
The first was to obey the laws
and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace
of God, I had been educated from my childhood and regulating my conduct in every
other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed
from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general
consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living.
For as I had from that time begun to hold my own opinions for naught
because I wished to subject them all to examination, I was convinced that I
could not do better than follow in the meantime the opinions of the most
judicious; and although there are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese as
judicious as among ourselves, expediency seemed to dictate that I should
regulate my practice conformably to the opinions of those with whom I should
have to live; and it appeared to me that, in order to ascertain the real
opinions of such, I ought rather to take cognizance of what they practiced than
of what they said, not only because, in the corruption of our manners, there are
few disposed to speak exactly as they believe, but also because very many are
not aware of what it is that they really believe; for, as the act of mind by
which a thing is believed is different from that by which we know that we
believe it, the one act is often found without the other.
Also, amid many opinions held in equal repute, I chose
always the most moderate, as much for the reason that these are always the most
convenient for practice, and probably the best (for all excess is generally
vicious), as that, in the event of my falling into error, I might be at less
distance from the truth than if, having chosen one of the extremes, it should
turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted.
And I placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which
somewhat of our freedom is abridged; not that I disapproved of the laws which,
to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution, when what is
sought to be accomplished is some good, permit engagements by vows and contracts
binding the parties to persevere in it, or even, for the security of commerce,
sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is
indifferent: but because I did not
find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change, and because, for
myself in particular, I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments, and not to
suffer them to deteriorate, I would have deemed it a grave sin against good
sense, if, for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time, I
therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time, when perhaps it
had ceased to be so, or I had ceased to esteem it such.
My second maxim was to be as firm
and resolute in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to
the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly
certain; imitating in this the example of travelers who, when they have lost
their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in
one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as
possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although perhaps
it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection; for in this
way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least
in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a
forest. In the same way, since in
action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it is very certain
that, when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act
according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark a
greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought notwithstanding to
choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to
practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain,
since the reason by which our choice has been determined
is itself possessed of these qualities.
This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those
repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such
feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle
of choice, allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best,
which they abandon the next, as the opposite.
My third maxim was to endeavor
always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than
the order of the world, and in general, accustom
myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts, there is nothing
absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in things external
to us, all wherein we fail of success is to be held, as regards us, absolutely
impossible: and this single
principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future
anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since our
will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding represents as
in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we consider all
external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more regret the absence
of such goods as seem due to our birth, when deprived of them without any fault
of ours, than our not possessing
the kingdoms of China or Mexico, and thus making, so to speak, a virtue of
necessity, we shall no more desire health in disease, or freedom in
imprisonment, than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds, or the wings of
birds to fly with. But I confess
there is need of prolonged discipline and frequently repeated meditation to
accustom the mind to view all objects in this light; and I believe that in this
chiefly consisted the secret of the power of such philosophers as in former
times were enabled to rise superior to the influence of fortune, and, amid
suffering and poverty, enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied.
For, occupied incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed
to their power by nature, they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at
their disposal except their own thoughts, that this conviction was of itself
sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects; and over
their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute, that they had some ground on
this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more powerful, more free and
more happy, than other men who, whatever be the favors heaped on them by nature
and fortune, if destitute of this philosophy, can never command the realization
of all their desires.
In fine, to conclude this code of
morals, I thought of reviewing the different occupations of men in this life,
with the view of making choice of the best.
And, without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments of others, I
may state that it was my conviction that I could not do better than continue in
that in which I was engaged, viz., in devoting my whole life to the culture of
my reason, and in making the greatest progress I was able in the knowledge of
truth, on the principles of the method which I had prescribed to myself.
This method, from the time I had begun to apply it, had been to me the
source of satisfaction so intense as to lead me to, believe that more perfect or
more innocent could not be enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily
discovered truths that appeared to me of some importance, and of which other men
were generally ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind
that I was wholly indifferent to every other object.
Besides, the three preceding maxims were founded singly on the design of
continuing the work of self-instruction.
For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which
to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed that I ought for a
single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had
resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining
these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task.
Nor could I have proceeded on such opinions without scruple, had I
supposed that I should thereby forfeit any advantage for attaining still more
accurate, should such exist. And,
in fine, I could not have restrained my desires, nor remained satisfied had I
not followed a path in which I thought myself certain of attaining all the
knowledge to the acquisition of which I was competent, as well as the largest
amount of what is truly good which I could ever hope to secure Inasmuch as we
neither seek nor shun any object except in so far as our understanding
represents it as good or bad, all that is necessary to right action is right
judgment, and to the best action the most correct judgment, that is, to the
acquisition of all the virtues with all else that is truly valuable and within
our reach; and the assurance of such an acquisition cannot fail to render us
contented.
Having thus provided myself with
these maxims, and having placed them in reserve along with the truths of faith,
which have ever occupied the first place in my belief, I came to the conclusion
that I might with freedom set about ridding myself of what remained of my
opinions. And, inasmuch as I hoped
to be better able successfully to accomplish this work by holding intercourse
with mankind, than by remaining longer shut up in the retirement where these
thoughts had occurred to me, I betook me again to traveling before the winter
was well ended. And, during the
nine subsequent years, I did nothing but roam from one place to another,
desirous of being a spectator
rather than an actor in the plays exhibited on the theater of the world; and, as
I made it my business in each matter to reflect particularly upon what might
fairly be doubted and prove a source of error, I gradually rooted out from my
mind all the errors which had hitherto crept into it.
Not that in this I imitated the skeptics who doubt only that they may
doubt, and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself; for, on the contrary, my
design was singly to find ground of assurance, and cast aside the loose earth
and sand, that I might reach the rock or the clay.
In this, as appears to me, I was successful enough; for, since I
endeavored to discover the falsehood or incertitude of the propositions I
examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I met
with nothing so doubtful as not to yield some conclusion of adequate certainty,
although this were merely the inference, that the matter in question contained
nothing certain. And, just as in
pulling down an old house, we usually reserve the ruins to contribute towards
the erection, so, in destroying such of my opinions as I judged to be
Ill-founded, I made a variety of observations and acquired an amount of
experience of which I availed myself in the establishment of more certain.
And further, I continued to
exercise myself in the method I had prescribed; for, besides taking care in
general to conduct all my thoughts according to its rules, I reserved some hours
from time to time which I expressly devoted to the employment of the method in
the solution of mathematical difficulties, or even in the solution likewise of
some questions belonging to other sciences, but which, by my having detached
them from such principles of these sciences as were of inadequate certainty,
were rendered almost mathematical:
the truth of this will be manifest from the numerous examples contained in this
volume. And thus, without in
appearance living otherwise than those who, with no other occupation than that
of spending their lives agreeably and innocently, study to sever pleasure from
vice, and who, that they may enjoy their leisure without ennui, have recourse to
such pursuits as are honorable, I was nevertheless prosecuting my design, and
making greater progress in the knowledge of truth, than I might, perhaps, have
made had I been engaged in the perusal of books merely, or in holding converse
with men of letters.
These nine years passed away,
however, before I had come to any determinate judgment respecting the
difficulties which form matter of dispute among the learned, or had commenced to
seek the principles of any philosophy more certain than the vulgar.
And the examples of many men of the highest genius, who had, in former
times, engaged in this inquiry, but, as appeared to me, without success, led me
to imagine it to be a work of so much difficulty, that I would not perhaps have
ventured on it so soon had I not heard it currently rumored that I had already
completed the inquiry. I know not
what were the grounds of this opinion; and, if my conversation contributed in
any measure to its rise, this must have happened rather from my having confessed
my Ignorance with greater freedom than those are accustomed to do who have
studied a little, and expounded perhaps, the reasons that led me to doubt of
many of those things that by others are esteemed certain, than from my having
boasted of any system of philosophy.
But, as I am of a disposition that makes me unwilling to be esteemed
different from what I really am, I thought it necessary to endeavor by all means
to render myself worthy of the reputation accorded to me; and it is now exactly
eight years since this desire constrained me to remove from all those places
where interruption from any of my acquaintances was possible, and betake myself
to this country, in which the long duration of the war has led to the
establishment of such discipline, that the armies maintained seem to be of use
only in enabling the inhabitants to enjoy more securely the blessings of peace
and where, in the midst of a great crowd actively engaged in business, and more
careful of their own affairs than curious about those of others, I have been
enabled to live without being deprived of any of the conveniences to be had in
the most populous cities, and yet as solitary and as retired as in the midst of
the most remote deserts.
PART IV
I am in doubt as to the propriety
of making my first meditations in the place above mentioned matter of discourse;
for these are so metaphysical, and so uncommon, as not, perhaps, to be
acceptable to every one. And yet,
that it may be determined whether the foundations that I have laid are
sufficiently secure, I find myself in a measure constrained to advert to them.
I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes
necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly
uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention
solely to the search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the
opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all
opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order
to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was
wholly indubitable. Accordingly,
seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there
existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in
reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of geometry,
I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the
reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I
considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when
awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time
not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had
ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the
illusions of my dreams. But
immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all
was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be
somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO
ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however
extravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded
that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the
philosophy of which I was in search.
In the next place, I attentively
examined what I was and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body,
and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could
not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very
circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most
clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had
only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined
had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I
existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature
consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place,
nor is dependent on any material thing; so that " I," that is to say, the mind
by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is
even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the
latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.
After this I inquired in general
into what is essential I to the truth and certainty of a proposition; for since
I had discovered one which I knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise be
able to discover the ground of this certitude.
And as I observed that in the words “I think, therefore I am,” there is
nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see
very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I
might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very
clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is
some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.
In the next place, from
reflecting on the circumstance that I doubted, and that consequently my being
was not wholly perfect (for I clearly saw that it was a greater perfection to
know than to doubt), I was led to inquire whence I had learned to think of
something more perfect than myself; and I clearly recognized that I must hold
this notion from some nature which in reality was more perfect.
As for the thoughts of many other objectsexternal to me, as of the sky,
the earth, light, heat, and a thousand more, I was less at a loss to know whence
these came; for since I remarked in them nothing which seemed to render them
superior to myself, I could believe that, if these were true, they were
dependencies on my own nature, in so far as it possessed a certain perfection,
and, if they were false, that I held them from nothing, that is to say, that
they were in me because of a certain imperfection of my nature.
But this could not be the case with-the idea of a nature more perfect
than myself; for to receive it from nothing was a thing manifestly impossible;
and, because it is not less repugnant that the more perfect should be an effect
of, and dependence on the less perfect, than that something should proceed from
nothing, it was equally impossible that I could hold it from myself:
accordingly, it but remained that it had been placed in me by a nature
which was in reality more perfect than mine, and which even possessed within
itself all the perfections of which I could form any idea; that is to say, in a
single word, which was God. And to
this I added that, since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was
not the only being in existence (I will here, with your permission, freely use
the terms of the schools); but, on the contrary, that there was of necessity
some other more perfect Being upon whom I was dependent, and from whom I had
received all that I possessed; for if I had existed alone, and independently of
every other being, so as to have had from myself all the perfection, however
little, which I actually possessed, I should have been able, for the same
reason, to have had from myself the whole remainder of perfection, of the want
of which I was conscious, and thus could of myself have become infinite,
eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and, in fine, have possessed all
the perfections which I could recognize in God.
For in order to know the nature of God (whose existence has been
established by the preceding reasonings), as far as my own nature permitted, I
had only to consider in reference to all the properties of which I found in my
mind some idea, whether their possession was a mark of perfection; and I
was assured that no one which indicated any imperfection was in him, and that
none of the rest was awanting. Thus
I perceived that doubt, inconstancy,
sadness, and such like, could not be found in God, since I myself would
have been happy to be free from them. Besides, I had ideas of many sensible and
corporeal things; for although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all
which I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the
ideas were in reality in my thoughts.
But, because I had already very clearly recognized in myself that the
intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, and as I observed that all
composition is an evidence of dependency, and that a state of dependency is
manifestly a state of imperfection, I therefore determined that it could not be
a perfection in God to be compounded of these two natures and that consequently
he was not so compounded; but that if there were any bodies in the world, or
even any intelligences, or other natures that were not wholly perfect, their
existence depended on his power in such a way that they could not subsist
without him for a single moment.
I was disposed straightway to
search for other truths and when I had represented to myself the object of the
geometers, which I conceived to be a continuous body or a space indefinitely
extended in length, breadth, and height or depth, divisible into divers parts
which admit of different figures and sizes, and of being moved or transposed in
all manner of ways (for all this the geometers suppose to be in the object they
contemplate),
I went over some of their simplest demonstrations.
And, in the first place, I observed, that the great certitude which by
common consent is accorded to these demonstrations, is founded solely upon this,
that they are clearly conceived in accordance with the rules I have already laid
down In the next place, I perceived that there was nothing at all in these
demonstrations which could assure me of the existence of their object:
thus, for example, supposing a triangle to be given, I distinctly
perceived that its three angles were necessarily equal to two right angles, but
I did not on that account perceive anything which could assure me that any
triangle existed: while, on the
contrary, recurring to the examination of the idea of a Perfect Being, I found
that the existence of the Being was comprised in the idea in the same way that
the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of
a triangle, or as in the idea of a sphere, the equidistance of all points on its
surface from the center, or even still more clearly; and that consequently it is
at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as any
demonstration of geometry can be.
But the reason which leads many
to persuade them selves that there is a difficulty in knowing this truth, and
even also in knowing what their mind really is, is that they never raise their
thoughts above sensible objects, and are so accustomed to consider nothing
except by way of imagination, which is a mode of thinking limited to material
objects, that all that is not imaginable seems to them not intelligible.
The truth of this is sufficiently manifest from the single circumstance,
that the philosophers of the schools accept as a maxim that there is nothing in
the understanding which was not previously in the senses, in which however it is
certain that the ideas of God and of the soul have never been; and it appears to
me that they who make use of their imagination to comprehend these ideas do
exactly the some thing as if, in order to hear sounds or smell odors, they
strove to avail themselves of their eyes; unless indeed that there is this
difference, that the sense of sight does not afford us an inferior assurance to
those of smell or hearing; in place of which, neither our imagination nor our
senses can give us assurance of anything
unless our understanding intervene.
Finally, if there be still
persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the
soul, by the reasons I have adduced, I am desirous that they should know that
all the other propositions, of the truth of which they deem themselves perhaps
more assured, as that we have a body, and that there exist stars and an earth,
and such like, are less certain; for, although we have a moral assurance of
these things, which is so strong that there is an appearance of extravagance in
doubting of their existence, yet at the same time no one, unless his intellect
is impaired, can deny, when the question relates to a metaphysical certitude,
that there is sufficient reason to exclude entire assurance, in the observation
that when asleep we can in the same way imagine ourselves possessed of another
body and that we see other stars and another earth, when there is nothing of the
kind. For how do we know that the
thoughts which occur in dreaming are false rather than those other which we
experience when awake, since the former are often not less vivid and distinct
than the latter? And though men of the highest genius study this question as
long as they please, I do not believe that they will be able to give any reason
which can be sufficient to remove this doubt, unless they presuppose the
existence of God. For, in the first
place even the principle which I have already taken as a rule, viz., that all
the things which we clearly and distinctly conceive are true, is certain only
because God is or exists and because he is a Perfect Being, and because all that
we possess is derived from him:
whence it follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their
clearness and distinctness are real, and proceed from God, must to that extent
be true. Accordingly, whereas we
not infrequently have ideas or notions in which some falsity is contained, this
can only be the case with such as are to some extent confused and obscure, and
in this proceed from nothing (participate of negation), that is, exist in us
thus confused because we are not wholly perfect.
And it is evident that it is not less repugnant that falsity or
imperfection, in so far as it is imperfection, should proceed from God, than
that truth or perfection should proceed from nothing.
But if we did not know that all which we possess of real and true
proceeds from a Perfect and Infinite Being, however clear and distinct our ideas
might be, we should have no ground on that account for the assurance that they
possessed the perfection of being true.
But after the knowledge of God
and of the soul has rendered us certain of this rule, we can easily understand
that the truth of the thoughts we experience when awake, ought not in the
slightest degree to be called in question on account of the illusions of our
dreams. For if it happened that an
individual, even when asleep, had some very distinct idea, as, for example, if a
geometer should discover some new demonstration, the circumstance of his being
asleep would not militate against its truth; and as for the most ordinary error
of our dreams, which consists in their representing to us various objects in the
same way as our external senses, this is not prejudicial, since it leads us very
properly to suspect the truth of the ideas of sense; for we are not infrequently
deceived in the same manner when awake; as when persons in the jaundice see all
objects yellow, or when the stars or bodies at a great distance appear to us
much smaller than they are. For, in
fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded
of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our reason.
And it must be noted that I say of our reason, and not of our imagination
or of our senses: thus, for
example, although we very clearly see the sun, we ought not therefore to
determine that it is only of the size which our sense of sight presents; and we
may very distinctly imagine the head of a lion joined to the body of a goat,
without being therefore shut up to the conclusion that a chimaera exists; for it
is not a dictate of reason that what we thus see or imagine is in reality
existent; but it plainly tells us that all our ideas or notions contain in them
some truth; for otherwise it could not be that God, who is wholly perfect and
veracious, should have placed them in us.
And because our reasonings are never so clear or so complete during sleep
as when we are awake, although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as
lively and distinct, if not more so than in our waking
moments, reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true
because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be
found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.
PART V
I would here willingly have
proceeded to exhibit the whole chain of truths which I deduced from these
primary but as with a view to this it would have been necessary now to treat of
many questions in dispute among the learned, with whom I do not wish to be
embroiled, I believe that it will be better for me to refrain from this
exposition, and only mention in general what these truths are, that the more
judicious may be able to determine whether a more special account of them would
conduce to the public advantage. I
have ever remained firm in my original resolution to suppose no other principle
than that of which I have recently availed myself in demonstrating the existence
of God and of the soul, and to accept as true nothing that did not appear to me
more clear and certain than the demonstrations of the geometers had formerly
appeared; and yet I venture to state that not only have I found means to satisfy
myself in a short time on all the principal difficulties which are usually
treated of in philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws established in
nature by God in such a manner, and of which he has impressed on our minds such
notions, that after we have reflected sufficiently upon these, we cannot doubt
that they are accurately observed in all that exists or takes place in the world
and farther, by considering the concatenation of these laws, it appears to me
that I have discovered many truths more useful and more important than all I had
before learned, or even had expected to learn.
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