Re-Forging the 'Age of Iron'  
Part I: The Tenth Century as the End of the Ancient World?  
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Abstract  
The tenth century, once dimissed as an unpleasant 'Age of Iron', now receives increased attention as an important age of transition. Historians are attempting to understand how it fits into the broader narrative of Western Civilization. Some have identified it as the last act of the post-Roman world. They identify its economy and social structures as Late Antique - at least until a 'feudal revolution' around the year 1000 suddenly swept them away. More professional soldiers based in new forts are said to mark the sudden advent of a new, more chaotic order. Church and state, rebuilding together after the invasions and civil wars of the late ninth century, self-consciously attempted, with varying degrees of success, to model themselves on Roman precedents. This movement culminated in the reign of Emperor Otto III (983–1002), who relocated the capital to Rome and dedicated himself 'to renew the ancient customs of the Romans'. The points of tangency cited between the Later Roman world and the tenth century are impressive, but a definitive judgement also requires that the century's novel aspects be considered.

The Dark Tenth Century  
When Renaissance humanists embraced an idealized Classical past, they spurned their medieval predecessors. They labeled everything between themselves and Rome the 'Middle Ages' (the 'Medium Aevum'), a dark age characterized by barbarisms such as 'Gothic' architecture. Even today the term 'medieval' remains sinister.¹ Most of its eras and areas ultimately found champions who discovered in them origins of Western Civilization, ages of faith, births of nations, reawakenings, renaissances, and other wonderful things. The tenth century, however, took a long time to get adopted, and up until the middle of the 20th, it remained deep in shadow, one of the darkest corners of the dark ages.

According to Cardinal Caesar Baronius (d. 1607) in his Annuales Ecclesiastici, the tenth century was an 'Age of Iron'; its disorderly papal politics particularly shocked this leader of the Catholic Reformation.² It was the first century in Christian history without a pope acclaimed a saint. Worse yet, it witnessed a 'papal pornography' at whose nadir, claimed Liudprand of Cremona (d. 972), lay the reign of Pope John XII (955–962), who allegedly turned the Lateran into a brothel and put such fear into the hearts of female pilgrims that they hesitated 'to visit the thresholds of the apostles for the sake of prayer, since they heard that ... several women, married, widowed, and virgins were forcefully raped there' (Liudprand's stories are so titillating that historians cannot resist telling them, despite the fact that he was a paid propagandist for John's enemies).³ Nor did chronic attacks from Vikings, Muslims, and Magyars help the century's reputation.

The 'Age of Iron' label stuck.⁴ In this alleged dark age, the lights really did seem to go out, or at least flicker badly. All over Europe, scholars have claimed, universal chronicles temporarily disappeared,⁵ poetic production was reduced,⁶ charters became less abundant,⁷
and written legislation dropped off precipitously. The medieval biographical tradition has such a striking lacuna between 920 and 960 that it is used to divide classical and early medieval traditions from new developments in the High Middle Ages— even the papal biographies in the Liber Pontificalis become sketchy after the reign of Stephen V (885–891). And after Stephen’s pontificate canonists stopped adding contemporary papal letters to their collections, a practice not reversed until the reign of Leo IX (1049–1054). Little wonder then that, in the traditional grand narrative of Western history, the tenth century appears as a painful interlude between the Carolingian world and the revival of high medieval Europe.

**The Tenth Century Rediscovered**

In the late 20th century, opinions began to change. Compare, for example, the first edition of the *Cambridge Medieval History* (1911–1936), where the tenth century is described in several chapters at the end of *Vol. III: Germany and the Western Empire* (1922), with the *New Cambridge Medieval History* (1995–2005), where all of *Volume III: c. 900–c. 1024* (1999) is devoted to a ‘long tenth century’, a period ‘crucial in the formation of Europe’. The tenth century is now the subject of conferences and works of analysis. Some scholars have even hailed it as a ‘renaissance’. Its major chronicles are now appearing in a spate of English translations.

The new popularity is due to converging historiographical trends. One is an expansion of the evidentiary base medieval historians use: after World War I, researchers associated with the journal *Annales* championed a new way of doing history that would incorporate charters, lives of the saints, liturgical works, archeological evidence, and all sorts of other materials that historians had often failed to exploit systematically— some of these ‘new’ sources offer illuminating perspectives on the tenth century. Increased concern with material culture undercut the negative stereotypes: in the words of Lord Kenneth Clarke’s famous series on civilization, ‘Historians usually consider the tenth century almost as dark and barbarous as the seventh. That is because they look at it from the point of view of political history and the written word. If we read what Ruskin called the book of art, we get a very different impression, because, contrary to all expectation, the tenth century produced work as splendid and technically skilful, even as delicate, as any other age’. Also important has been the development of women’s studies— the tenth century had powerful women, perhaps because their personal connections and roles in court ritual had more importance in a world where institutional structures were still embryonic. Most important, however, may have been an expansion of the mental map of Europe: traditional medieval history privileged England, France, Germany, and Italy (after World War I even Germany sometimes got marginalized), but now ‘Europe’ seems larger. Spain, after Franco, became a lively field for international medieval research. The fall of the Iron Curtain brought Slavic and Magyar nations into Western Europe. Scandinavian states became part of the Common Market. This wider Europe pays more attention to the tenth century because their communities north, south, east, and west of the Frankish core were beginning to create their own identities.

*Where Does the Tenth Century Fit?*

New interest in the tenth century has led to new debates. So long as the tenth century could be dismissed as a cultural dead zone, scholars were not compelled to debate its significance, but if it has its own identity (identities?), its place in the grand narrative...
of Western Civilization becomes more problematic. Where does it fit? Scholars have come to very different conclusions. For some, the tenth century marks the end of the ancient world, a last burst and implosion of Late Antiquity. For others, it is the birth of the High Middle Ages, and, more grandly, the beginning of the Ancien Régime that would dominate Europe until the French Revolution and would remain influential long afterwards. Yet others see it as ‘Francia II’, the sequel, a new flowering of the economic, political, and cultural achievements made by the Franks under the Carolingians.

This present study discusses the tenth century as the end of the ancient world. Scholars analyzing its economic and social structures, its military developments, and its ecclesiastical and political Roman restorations have described it as the final flowering of Late Antiquity. In a subsequent survey in History Compass, however, I will be examining perspectives that emphasize the century’s novelties rather than its continuities with the ancient world. The conflicting perspectives reflect not only diverse features of the tenth-century but also opposing presuppositions about the essential features of Western Civilization that scholars bring with them to its study. Debates about the tenth century continue as scholars attempt to find the model that illuminates best and obscures least.

The Ancient World Marches Forward

Up until a century ago, no educated modern person would have thought to link the civilization of ancient Rome to that of tenth-century Western Europe. According to Edward Gibbon, the Roman Empire (‘the most civilized portion of mankind’) fell because of ‘the triumph of barbarism and religion’: he viewed the tenth century in the Latin West as ‘an age of ignorance’ characterized by triumphant barbarians.18 After World War I, however, Rome would not stay ‘fallen’. Its legions were led into new chronological territory by the great Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (d. 1935), who claimed that Rome’s economic and intellectual civilization continued even after the deposition of its last western emperor in 476, that the ‘truly essential features of ... Roman culture’ maintained a ‘Mediterranean unity’ persisting until the rise of Islam; that the West fell back onto its own northern European Germanic resources after Islamic piracy closed the Mediterranean, so that ‘without Mohammed, Charlemagne would have been inconceivable’.19 Pirenne’s so-called ‘Romania’ brought the Roman world into the eighth century. Then as critics of the ‘Pirenne thesis’ attempted to ascertain whether the ‘Roman’ Mediterranean had really been disrupted by Islam, they discovered a Charlemagne who looked less like the hairy German warrior immortalized in the bronze statue in front of Notre Dame and more like the laurel-wreathed ‘Carolus Imperator Augustus’ on the faux Roman coins he minted, an emperor closely connected to the Mediterranean world who lived in a Late-Roman-style provincial imperial palace complex at Aachen.20 When did ‘Romania’ actually end? That question seems especially disquieting because Peter Brown, the great rehabilitator of the sophisticated world of Late Antiquity, has delighted over the years in warning audiences that ‘Late Antiquity is later than you think’.21

Not everyone is sanguine about Late Antiquity’s expansion.22 If Rome’s academic legions want to lay claim to the entire early medieval West, they need to identify a grand strategy, an underlying mission lending vitality to what had appeared to be simply the detritus of a fallen civilization. Rome’s final mission, it is now alleged, was to change barbarians into Romans or at least into Rome-friendly nations. This perspective, long implicit in the sweeping theses of Roman Catholic apologists such as the sociologist Christopher Dawson,23 is now explicit in Walter Goffart’s survey of ‘Rome’s Final Conquest: The Barbarians’, which is presented here in History Compass.24 These barbarians,
no longer the ferocious alien 'other', have now metamorphosed into pillars of the old Roman system, client peoples essential to Roman society whose regularization had always been an on-going task.

Note that if the master narrative of post-Roman Western history becomes the Romanization of new peoples, then this story reaches its logical conclusion when, at the end of the tenth century, the Scandinavians, Slavs, and Magyars were all drawn firmly into the Roman orbit. This expansion has even been suggested as the real catalyst for the break up of Mediterranean unity – Pirenne’s major theme – since late ninth- and tenth-century ecclesiastical rivalries over Eastern Europe seriously exacerbated differences between Latin and Greek Christians. Locating the division between the old world and the new around the year 1000 harmonizes with Europe’s newly expanded historiographical consciousness because at that time the nations to the north and east were simultaneously converting to Christianity, forming proto-states, and experiencing increasing Frankish cultural hegemony.

A problem with making Rome’s civilizing mission the master narrative is that it was not completely successful – I am writing here in English, not Latin. The partial failure has been explained by one of the many European intellectuals displaced by the Nazis, Peter Munz (d. 2007), who, after observing New Zealanders and Maoris attempting to accommodate each other in his new homeland, came to the conclusion that early medieval history ‘is essentially a history of the gradual dissolution of tribes’, a dynamic that could inspire Charlemagne but also thwart him inasmuch as it created both chaos and alternative structures that could get in the way of a restored Roman order. According to Munz, the period between the Roman Empire and the developed feudal monarchies resembles modern European colonization and decolonization, both in the destruction of indigenous cultures and in the unpredictable cultural syntheses that followed. Moreover, a goal partially attained can be a dead end. Achieved goals are obsolete, their inadequacies glaringly obvious. Scholars who see the tenth century as the end of the ancient world in the Latin West often find themselves simultaneously elucidating both the ‘Romanness’ of the century and its disjunctions with the following age.

Did the Ancient Economic Order Survive until a Millennial ‘Feudal Revolution’?

Historians who place the tenth century in the ancient world usually point first to its economic and social order. Their arguments are complex. Some consensus exists about economic organization before and after the Early Middle Ages. In the hierarchically organized Later Roman Empire, centers attempted to dominate peripheries (not always with great success). The countryside featured large, self-sufficient estates, depending to a greater or lesser extent on unfree labor. Economic transactions, even labor agreements, came to rely more on barter and gift, less on money. The resulting economy was increasingly static, but had the virtues of stability and predictability. This differs greatly from the world of the High Middle Ages, where dramatic rural and urban demographic growth were associated with expanding local and international markets. Peasants cultivated more and more land. Agricultural slavery had disappeared, and slavery itself was rare except for domestic slaves in maritime regions, most often females. The new rural economy was a tight patchwork of castles, territorial lordships, villages, parishes, and towns. What is debated is how Europe managed to move from one system to the other. Medieval historians traditionally postulated a long, slow transition, and treated the records surviving from the Carolingian Empire as an economic ‘snapshot’ taken at some point near the middle of a linear development. But now a new scenario is on the table.
Could the ancient rural economy have continued on in the Latin west—despite multiple crises, fluctuations, and local anomalies—right up until the very end of the tenth century, and then undergone a cataclysmic metamorphosis, an economic and social paradigm shift that created the world of the High Middle Ages? Part of the inspiration for this theory comes from Marxist economics which equate production in the ancient world with a slave economy and in the medieval world with a feudal economy, a distinction that left Marxist scholars uncomfortable about the half millennium of early medieval history whose ‘mode of production’ was not obviously either. More than a half century ago, Georges Duby, studying the Mâconnais (the well documented region around the monastery of Cluny), described a rapid structural transformation around the turn of the millennium when lesser nobles and knights usurped power; in the 1960s, he labeled this a ‘feudal revolution’ (a ‘révolution féodale’). French scholars ran with this model. Lively debate ensued. Scholars have identified trans-European and even worldwide manifestations. A related way to conceptualize rapid shifts to new forms of seigneurial exploitation is ‘encastellation’ (an awkward anglicization of the Italian ‘encastellamento’), the construction of vast numbers of fortified centers throughout the interior of Europe, a process that began in a major way in the tenth century and burgeoned in the 11th and 12th. Although the castles and fortified villages originally had military purposes, they fostered greater control by lords as they encouraged people to move from dispersed households and hamlets into more concentrated settlements. Violence emanating from these castles is said to have brought down the old rural order. In fact, scholars describing a ‘feudal revolution’ almost always document their cases with anecdotal reports of violence, even though some skeptics question whether it might not also have been possible to collect similar tales of woe from other time periods such as the ninth century, or whether the clergyman reporting ‘violence’ were always disinterested witnesses, or whether an alleged increase in accounts of violence might reflect changes in the processes of reporting rather than in the underlying conduct.

In the film The Wild One (1954), Marlon Brando, challenged to name what he was rebelling against, asked ‘What have you got?’ If there were a ‘feudal revolution’, to what was it opposed? What have the mutationistes got? Their grand vision is compelling enough in the abstract. They argue that up through the tenth century the old order in the countryside still included a ‘public sphere’ that in theory, although not always in practice, represented an overarching ideal of order and public good. The rebels were lesser lords, castellans, and knights who within a couple of generations completely privatized the old public order, grabbed governmental powers for themselves, and forced all elements of society to accede to their demands. To formulate this model too clearly: tenth-century lordship would have been exercised publicly by traditional public officials for the public good. eleventh-century lordship privately by usurpers for self-aggrandizement. But what demonstrates this? Government property, the old imperial jure acquired by post-Roman kings, offers no help as an index, since chunks of lands and revenues were continually alienated throughout the Early Middle Ages, and since, as Carolingian monarchs became weaker during the ninth century, the counts who were their administrators tended to silently absorb public property into their own holdings. Even in Charlemagne’s day, governmental offices were often inherited. Elite expectations of gifts and ‘fiefs’ as payments for services do not constitute any distinctive change inasmuch as Carolingian governmental ‘officials’ had always been ‘aristocrats first, royal agents second’.

One possible marker is the placitum, the public tribunal run by the count, which became increasingly rare in some parts of Europe after the tenth century. Related to this breakdown of higher justice would have been the seigneurie basale, lesser lords who acquired the judicial power of command (the ban), and used such banal lordship to
homogenize all peasant farmers – slaves, non-slave tenants, and even free men within their legal jurisdictions – into an amorphous class of dependent serfs. But would the breakdown of a somewhat centralized court system, one more distinguished for social compromise than for abstract justice, have been a sufficient reason for a rapid social and political structural shift?

The proof for such a shift is said to be the decline of slavery. It is claimed that tenth-century Europe was still a ‘slave society’. Recent studies have certainly expanded knowledge of early medieval slavery in the Latin West, demonstrating not only its importance but also some surprising geographical and chronological variations. But in the tenth century, leaving aside those owned by Vikings and Muslims, slaves are not very conspicuous. Thus those who claim that tenth-century Europe was a ‘slave society’ find it necessary to argue that just as in today’s ‘capitalist societies’ only a small minority of people may actually control the means of production and dominate markets, but yet are still able to impose their social values on all who aspire to such advantages so also in a ‘slave society’ even rare slavery could still be a determinative social structure if those people who were slaveholders thereby gained a superior social status that non-slaveholders would want to acquire. This argument, however, derives much of its force from verbal slippage: ‘slavery’ is technically a legal state of non-freedom, not necessarily connected to systems of ‘plantation slavery’ such as those known in the ancient world and in the antebellum American South; to make slavery the major marker of the survival (or absence) of the ancient economy puts a heavy burden on a purely legal construct that, in practice, might not have greatly differentiated the day-to-day lives of slaves from those of their neighbors, other peasant farmers who might also owe produce and labor to the very same lords. The disappearance of agricultural slavery in the High Middle Ages might reflect its irrelevance rather than prove that oppressive overlords had suddenly revolutionized society by trapping slaves and all other peasant farmers in an arbitrary net of serfdom.

**Mutations in a Roman Military Order?**

Tenth-century nations resembled Rome by employing professional military forces. Although in the days of the Republic a Roman citizen army had been able to conquer much of the Mediterranean coast, professionals took over once the demands of ruling a world empire became too great. German nations also formerly had citizen armies consisting of all free able-bodied males of appropriate age. Scholars increasingly doubt, however, that the ideal of ‘a nation in arms’ remained practical over the centuries, even among the Anglo-Saxons and the Lombards whose laws and texts sometimes seem to presuppose it. More typical was the way Charlemagne assembled his forces for battle: he normally summoned his own and his counts’ military households (the well-trained special forces mobilized by warlords since late antiquity); for a larger army he called up a select levy from free men of property, perhaps supplemented by allies or mercenaries; only for emergency defense in border areas did he employ mass mobilization. His most important troops were heavily armored professional soldiers. Although they had horses for transport, whether or not they actually fought on horseback has been the subject of a long historiographical debate: it had been claimed that heavily armored cavalrymen dominated battlefields ever since the Battle of Adrianople (378); then Lynn White Jr. linked the ascendancy of the knight to technological changes in the Carolingian era such as the adoption of the stirrup and ‘mounted shock combat’ (attack with the lance held at rest against the body, so that it struck its target with the combined force of horse and rider); after White’s thesis was overthrown by evidence indicating that Carolingian forces usually
still fought on foot, scholars continued to search for a post-Carolingian ‘military revolution’ that would mark the knight’s definitive ascent, perhaps in Germany in the tenth century. Today some scholars question whether mounted knights ever dominated early medieval battlefields. What can be affirmed is that armored professional soldiers gained importance in the tenth century thanks to the spread of improved military technology, more affordable iron armor, and, most important of all, the ability of soldiers based in newly constructed castles to harass all the countryside within a half day’s ride. Popular militias, on the other hand, except when defending well-planned fortified positions, were increasingly useless against these military professionals.

This shifting balance had social consequences. On one hand, the transition to more professional military forces made society more ‘Roman’, and in places where overlords could actually control their vassals more hierarchical. Yet the old Carolingian order’s relatively small ruling elite — the ruler’s relatives, friends, and officeholders — now had to come to terms with more numerous and increasingly powerful professional fighters, some possessing their own fortified bases. So did peasant farmers. The result could be fundamental changes in political and social relationships. As champions of ‘feudal mutation’ describe this process:

From the very heart of the “primitive” peasantry came those who allowed its domestication. Here too we can see more clearly today that those not-so-chivalrous knights ... were not all of noble family, far from it. The vast majority of these henchmen, these “fist men,” were born of the decomposition, the “kulakization,” of ancient country society. In order to be “higher” than the others, they agreed to serve, thus making possible the final victory of the warrior households over the peasant neighborhoods. Once the fundamenatal character of this movement was determined, there was little room for chronological fluctuations; by the decades around the year 1000 the western European world had fundamentally changed.

A Roman Ecclesiastical and Political Order?

The institutions of Church and state in the tenth century were consciously modeled on Roman precedent, perhaps more closely than in any earlier or later medieval century. Today’s scholars usually prefer to treat Church and state as separate institutions, but no sharp distinctions were drawn here by Constantine, Charlemagne, and the unbroken line of Roman emperors who still ruled out of Constantinople. In theory, rulers held their powers from the Lord, and, as his vassals, were obliged to safeguard religious interests — to protect, promote, and enrich the Lord’s Church. The first Carolingian kings and emperors used ecclesiastical recognition and ceremony to justify their usurpation, but based their actual power primarily on their own resources and on their ability to unite local aristocratic factions. Later Carolingian rulers and their non-Carolingian successors, weakened by factional wars and invasions, depended more and more upon the institutional Church. The tenth century saw increasingly elaborate coronation ceremonies. Kings had thrones in great churches. As itinerant rulers, they routinely sought hospitality at their major churches and monasteries, and they had a vested interest in ensuring that these way stations could provide it. They exercised control by patronage and by promoting their own candidates for ecclesiastical offices.

Educated churchmen thought in Roman terms and helped spread Roman ideals. In Ottonian Germany, the imperial clergy led by Archbishop Bruno of Cologne (953–65), the chancellor and half brother of Otto I, developed styles of conduct and public service that introduced courtly behavior to Germanic warlords. The court promoted a Ciceronian
philosophy of public service. Prince bishops, clean-shaven in the Roman style and wearing clerical vestments derived from Rome, helped make hisurate German warlords obsolete. In the absence of effective state institutions, churchmen and rulers utilized Rome-oriented ritual and symbolism to domesticate unruly nobles.

Public classicism was not limited to German nobles: around the millennium some French lords — including the dukes of Normandy, the counts of Anjou, and the dukes of Aquitaine — were also distinguished for Roman ceremonies and affectations. Simple knights, however, would need more time, perhaps until the 12th century, to acquire any coherent chivalric courtly ideology. A self-conscious classical revival in tenth-century schools has been claimed as the start of the renaissance of which the famed ‘Renaissance of the Twelfth Century’ was the conclusion. In regard to the more practical arts of Rome, it is noteworthy that Vitruvius’ De Architectura survives in a half dozen or more tenth-century copies, more than from any other pre-Renaissance century.

Tenth-century clerics self-consciously evoked Rome by incorporating into their new churches elements taken from ancient buildings (spolia) and by modeling their churches on those built by Constantine in Rome and Jerusalem. Yet clerics did not rely very much upon the pope’s direct administrative authority. The bishop of Rome was an important symbolic figure who, as the leader of the West’s most prestigious church, could be called upon to validate ecclesiastical arrangements throughout the Latin West, but the surviving tenth-century papal letters do not demonstrate consistent Roman leadership or bureaucratic sophistication.

Otto III and Roman Restoration

The most cited example of Roman influence on tenth-century politics is the career of Otto III (king 983–1002, emperor 996–1002), who received much recent scholarly attention during the millennial anniversaries of his reign. His grandfather Otto I (936–973), after acquiring an imperial crown in Rome in 962, attempted to affirm his status by arranging for his son Otto II to marry a Byzantine princess. Empress Theophanou brought Greek art, learning, and personnel to the West. Otto III, her son, was raised to be an old-style emperor. His tutor, Gerbert of Rheims, was not modest about the program:

Ours, ours is the Roman Empire. Italy, fertile in fruits, Lorraine and Germany, fertile in men, offer their resources, and even the strong kingdoms of the Slavs are not lacking to us. Our August emperor of the Romans art thou, Caesar, who, sprung from the noblest blood of the Greeks, surpass the Greeks in empire and govern the Romans by hereditary right, but both you surpass in genius and eloquence.

How dedicated Gerbert was to the restoration of Rome is indicated by the name he chose when Otto III helped arrange his election as pope, Sylvester II, evoking Sylvester I, the pope during Constantine’s reign. Otto III adopted an imperial lead seal that boasted of ‘The Renewal of the Roman Empire’ (Renovatio imperii Romanorum). His aim, a contemporary claimed, was not just to renew the Empire but also ‘to renew the ancient customs of the Romans, now mostly obliterated’. He moved his court to Rome, took up residence on the Palatine hill, and awarded Greek and Latin titles to his followers. Questions about the novelty, coherence, sincerity, and audience of this imperial initiative continue to elicit lively scholarly debate.

Otto III symbolizes not only the desire to restore the Roman Empire but also its impracticality. While residing in Rome, he found the Germans difficult to govern and the Romans impossible. Soon he was forced to leave the city, and later, after a brief
eretical interlude, he died while preparing to besiege it. He was only 22. The princess bride he had requested from Constantinople arrived in Italy too late and was sent back home. 'Renovatio imperii Romanorum' had failed. In the Byzantine East, an autocrat aided by a long-established bureaucracy could still rule in a late Roman manner over an autarchic, fragmented populace; in the Latin West, a ruler without a developed bureaucratic apparatus was confronted by congeries of peoples and territories, nobles with their own military households, powerful lineages, social classes with strong internal horizontal links, and cities and confraternities developing their own new power bases. So great were the obstacles to Roman-style rule that one is tempted to interpret tenth-century Romanophile ideology as a poignant nostalgia for an ideal world order that people vaguely recognized was slipping away, much like the affection of 19th-century Americans for the simple country life depicted in Currier & Ives prints or the fascination of 20th-century Americans with the cowboys and Indians of the 'Westerns'.

Conclusion: The Tenth Century as the End of the Ancient World?

Historical periods are artificial constructs. No one woke up the end of the tenth century and recognized that the ancient world had come to a close. It was once believed that people at the start of the year 1000 expected to wake up to the imminent end of the whole world, but the millenialist traditions involved, as illuminated by recent scholarly debates about the 'terrors of the year 1000', turn out to be much more diffuse. The flow of time was seamless.

Amateur and professional historians create historical periodization in order to orient themselves and their audiences to major changes over time. Separating history into 'ages' is pedagogically useful insofar as it situates past events in gross chronological frameworks and makes it easier to recognize relationships and developments. Yet there is a perpetual need to balance the benefits gained against the harms inherent in oversimplification.

Thanks to impressive academic studies over the last generation, Late Antiquity has come into its own. Scholars have illuminated its rich intellectual life, its impressive Christian culture, and its continuing, though much transformed, economic, political, and social systems. The Roman Empire is now 'transformed', not 'fallen'. But, if there were no clearly demarcated fall of the Roman Empire, then when did Roman civilization become so irrevocably transformed that it can no longer function effectively as an explanatory device? Advancing units of Rome's academic legions have been attempting to claim for themselves all of the Early Middle Ages, and to imagine the tenth century as the ancient world's last curtain call, Late Antiquity's final bow before it yielded to the High Middle Ages, the first stage of a recognizably modern world. Aspects of this case are convincing: the continuities and connections cited are impressive.

Yet not everyone is prepared to consign the tenth century to the ancient world. Scholars adopting very different perspectives have seen it as the start, or even as the second stage, of a whole new medieval world. Their arguments also deserve a hearing and will be presented in 'Re-forging the Age of Iron, Part II' to follow in History Compass.

Short Biography

John Howe studies the ecclesiastical and social history of tenth- through 12th-century Europe and is now at work on a survey of The Revival of the Latin Church: The 'Pre-Gregorian' Reform. He is the author of Church Reform and Social Change in Eleventh-Century Central Italy: Dominic of Sona and His Patrons (1997, recipient of the American Catholic Historical
Association's John Gilmary Shea Prize in 1998) and editor (with Michael Wolfe) of Inventing Medieval Landscapes: Senses of Place in Western Europe (2002). His contributions to historical journals in many countries include hagiographical source criticism, inventories for the German Institute in Paris's project on the Sources hagiographiques de la Côte, studies highlighting ecclesiastical and social changes in central Italy, and hagiographical reviews. He earned his doctoral degree from the University of California at Los Angeles (1979). He has taught medieval history at Texas Tech University since 1981, with breaks that include service as a Fellow of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton (2001) and as a Senior Research Associate at the Erasmus Institute at the University of Notre Dame (2003–04).

Notes
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For the sources for the history of the tenth century, see Reuter, 'Introduction: Reading the Tenth Century', NCAHM, 3 (1999), 1–24.


F. R. Sullow, 'The Carolingian Age: Reflections on its Place in the History of the Middle Ages', Speculum, 64 (1989): 217–30, esp. 281–85, argues for Carolingian continuity with the Late Antique world. An indication of this widespread acceptance of this view is that G. W. Bowersock, P. Brown, and O. Grabar (eds.), Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), ix, are able to assume, without feeling compelled to offer any justification, that Late Antiquity extends to 800.
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55 On the continuity of the Roman fisc into the Carolingian era, see Durliat, Les finances publiques, esp. 287-301, and B. S. Bachrach, Are They Not Like Us? The Carolingian Fisc in Political Perspective, in Ghalzelle and Lethier (eds.), Paradigms and Methods, 119-133.


58 As the French jargon indicates, the banale scigienne model, whatever universal claims have been made for it, is rooted in French local conditions. Perhaps the best attempt to relate it to other tenth-century types of territorial lordship is C. Violante, 'La signoria rurale nel secolo X: Proposte tipologiche', in Il Secolo di ferro, vol. 1, 329-89.


61 In Italy, a decline of slavery beginning before the tenth century is documented in G. Luzatto, I servi nelle grandi proprietà feudali italiane del secolo IX e X (Senigallia: Società tipografica Marchigiana, 1989), repr. in Dai servi della gleba agli abbon del capitano: Storia del servitù economico, Fascicolo IX (Bari: Laterza, 1966), 1-17. In England, where Viking settlement ought to have promoted slavery, Pelser, Slavery, 259, believes that 'the number of slaves was substantially reduced in the century and a half preceding the Conquest'; he offers a Donadio figure of around 10% of the population (192-93). Bois, Transformation, 20-22, who emphasizes the significance of slaves to the region around Lournard, nevertheless calculates that they only constituted about 15% of the inhabitants. Bois, Transformation, 22.

62 Horizontal recruitment by the king from a social class is discussed in Hafall, Winfead and Society, 40-70. For skepticism about the persistence of mass mobilization, see R. P. Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), esp. 175-70; and Delogu, 'Lebardi and Caraburgh: Italy', in NCAH, 2 (1995): 291-319, esp. 290-311 and 292-93.


41 On the strengths and weaknesses of popular militias, see Bachrach and Bachrach, 'Saxon Military Revolution'.

42 Poly and Bournaud, *Fental Transformation*, 353.


47 In the tenth century, many lay orders, including the Ottonian emperors, followed the predominant Roman and ducal example and became clean-shaven; see G. Constantine, 'Introduction on Beards in the Middle Ages', in R. B. C. Huygens (ed.), *Apologie Daur, Corpus Christianum Continuato Mediaevalis*, vol. 62 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 47–131, esp. 62–63 and 92–95.


Re-Forging the ‘Age of Iron’: Part I

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Re-Forging the 'Age of Iron': Part I

Re-Forging the ‘Age of Iron’
Part II: The Tenth Century in a New Age?

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Abstract

The tenth century, once dismissed as an unpleasant ‘Age of Iron’, now receives increased attention as an important age of transition. Historians are attempting to understand how it fits into the broader narrative of Western Civilization. Although some scholars have identified it as the last act of the post-Roman world, others see it as a new age. Perhaps the High Middle Ages with its agricultural and demographic revolution, its new villages and parishes, its revived cities, its reformed churches and schools, and its medieval monarchs began in the tenth century? Or were those changes not novelties of the tenth century but rather manifestations of a ‘take off’ that had already begun back in the Carolingian Empire, and which, despite the problems posed by late Carolingian wars and invasions, was able to continue, spread, and blossom into the growth and prosperity of the High Middle Ages? New scholarly interest in the tenth century has made it much less of a ‘dark age’, but scholars still are not quite certain how to conceptualize its historical significance.

Textbooks on Western Civilization normally devote a chapter to ‘Europe in the High Middle Ages’. This periodization assumes that after Europe had survived its post-Carolingian crises it began an age of growth lasting several centuries: agriculture expanded, technology advanced, cities multiplied, international trade revived, and Frankish social and political institutions spread to new areas. Chapters on ‘The High Middle Ages’ attractively describe magnificent churches and castles, fledgling universities, and the ‘birth of the state’; they present this period as the highpoint of the whole medieval millennium.

How is the tenth century related to the chapter on the High Middle Ages? Initially, it was the foil, the Dark Age against which Europe’s revival could shine more brightly. Yet over the course of the last century the historiographical center of gravity of the High Middle Ages has been subtly sliding backwards. The Gothic Image and The Thirteenth: Greatest of Centuries gloved less brightly against The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century; then the The Making of the Middle Ages, The Formation of a Persecuting Society, and The Making of Europe highlighted the seminal role of the eleventh. As historians continue their (perhaps inadvisable) quest for origins, they confront the possibility that the High Middle Ages began in the tenth century.

According to Robert Fossier, ‘... almost all the observations which one can make, whatever the preoccupation of individual historians, point to the tenth century as the age of growth, of take-off, of rising, or some such phrase’. To prove this, however, is not easy. One problem is that ‘renaissances’ and ‘golden ages’, although they shine brightly enough from a distance, upon closer examination usually prove to be amorphous agglomerations of whatever their inventors considered politically correct and appealing, supplemented by a few later modifications added by partisans attempting to keep them relevant. Another problem is that the extraordinary prosperity of the High Middle Ages cannot be explained in terms of one or two historical variables, but rather seems to manifest what economists call a ‘virtuous cycle’, a convergence of multiple positive trends mutually promoted by their interactions. To relate the tenth century to the High Middle Ages
requires item-by-item comparisons that undercut the attempt to comprehend an interrelated totality.

In an earlier article in *History Compass* on ‘Reforging the “Age of Iron”’, I examined recent efforts to present the tenth century as the end of the ancient world. That model by no means exhausts scholarly creativity. Academics have been developing other ways to place the tenth century into the grand narrative of Western Civilization, models looking more toward the future than the past. They see the tenth century as the birthplace of the High Middle Ages, or, alternatively, as a manifestation of a new Europe that had already begun to take shape back in the Carolingian world. These arguments too deserve analysis.

**Tenth-Century Agricultural and Demographic Revival?**

Today’s historians usually cite agricultural and demographic expansion as the keys to high medieval prosperity, although they hesitate to specify which came first inasmuch as that would involve a classic ‘chicken or egg’ dilemma concerning whether increased food production led to more people or more people required more food. When did this surge begin? French scholars associated with the journal *Annales* initially assumed it would have started in the mid-eleventh century, but as their research on relatively neglected sources such as place names, field systems, and other marks of rural development progressed, the *Annales* found themselves backdating the take-off in particular areas into the tenth or even the late ninth century. To identify a precise point when equilibrium shifted is not easy. Robert Fossier, after summarizing earlier efforts and expressing his own preference for a mid tenth-century demographic revival, nevertheless admitted that, given the thinness of the sources, ‘one has to say in all honesty that we can assume but cannot prove’.

Why were there more people? Farmers in the tenth century benefitted from the start of the ‘Medieval Warming Period’, the milder and drier climate that would characterize the High Middle Ages. New systems of internal fortification increased stability. More efficient (oppressive?) lordship motivated peasants to produce greater surpluses. Agricultural productivity may have benefited from widespread adoption of technological improvements, a theory popularized by Lynn White Jr., who saw horsehoe, a new horse collar, and a post-invasion shift to heavy plows and the three-field system all leading to ‘an agricultural revolution of the early Middle Ages’ that ‘provided surplus food which, from the tenth century on, permitted rapid urbanization’. White was severely criticized by scholars who claimed that the technological developments he heralded had been adopted much earlier. Nonetheless, on some things he may have been right; tenth-century England, for example, saw the ‘decisive’ reintroduction and triumph of the heavy plow, a new expansion of arable, more exploitation of water-power, and new Benedictine communities intent on improving their holdings; or again, although the debate on horse equipment has shifted from questions about padded collars and horseshoes to a cluster of technological devices related to carts and plows, evidence does suggest, if not ‘revolution’, at least tenth-century progress. The tenth century seems to have been a particularly dynamic era, but regional differences militate against any neat ‘agricultural revolution’. Because agriculture is inherently bound to the soil, any ‘take-offs’ must have depended upon very specific geographical, social and political contexts. Perhaps the most that can be claimed for agricultural progress is that the “technological package” of c. 900–1300 coincides with a remarkable period of general growth in the economy.
A Tenth-Century Revival of Villages, Cities, and Commerce?

The birth of the village has been claimed for the tenth century. Today European villages seem part of a timeless landscape, but their locations frequently conflict with the remains of an earlier rural world of villas and square 'centuriated' fields. Place names suggest that in many regions the ancient landscape had been restructured prior to the year 1000. The tenth-century Mediterranean world saw the effective emergence of nucleated, fortified settlements, although some areas in Spain and Italy began the process earlier and new peripheral settlements would continue to appear in later centuries. In the north, the restructuring was also associated with the process of internal fortification that promoted tighter territorial lordships and concentrated settlements within them. Groups of people could make better use of expensive complicated machinery such as water mills and heavy plows (whose large teams of oxen were more efficient if fields were reorganized into long strips). Larger settlements were able to accommodate specialized craftsmen. Well-anchored villages put an end to the 'settlement mobility' (the tendency of communities to move within their effective areas of exploitation or even to relocate to entirely new areas) which had been characteristic of northern and western European settlements from pre-history through most of the Early Middle Ages. New villages often became the centers of parishes. The ancient world had had cathedral churches, baptismal churches, and private churches and chapels. Mission regions sometimes developed extended church systems, as in England with its 'ministers' (originally monasteries), which were actually rural collegiate churches administering families of smaller churches and chapels. In the tenth century, parishes began to coalesce, although in many areas it would be well into the thirteenth before the final decisions were made about such aspects of parish organization as the duties of parishioners, the exact locations of parish boundaries, and the rules governing which clergymen could legitimately exercise 'care of souls'. The church was a village's most conspicuous building, and, unlike the more ephemeral peasant houses around it which were continually modified and rebuilt, it was frequently made of stone, signifying permanence and echoing the high civilization of Rome. Parishes and villages sometimes grew up around pre-existing churches or cemeteries. Special chapels or areas in monastic churches could also provide a center. Often the lord himself built the village church, but it could still function as the heart of a parish community so long as villagers identified with it. The parish priest, at his best, was a hinge person who linked the 'little tradition' of the village to the greater traditions of Latin Christendom.

Medieval cities, not the countryside which fed them, were what had originally captured the attention of economic historians. In the lead here was Henri Pirenne, who was convinced that 'the disappearance of trade, in the ninth century, annihilated the last vestiges of city life'; then, however, he saw an increasingly stable, better fortified tenth century which foretold 'in outline the picture which the eleventh century presents' and which witnessed the initial prosperity of trading cities such as Bruges or those along the Rhine. Pirenne focused on the revival of cities in his native Low Countries, but other scholars documented tenth-century urban revivals in Italy, England, and France. The much maligned barbarian invaders actually played an important part, not only by the examples of the entrepôts through which they shipped their own loot but also by the fact that they were more adept at harassing than besieging, which led to their inflicting disproportionate damage on the countryside and suburbs, thus driving people into walled cities, many of which, archaeology now reveals, actually gained population during the tenth century.
The revival of cities correlates with a revival of trade, a 'European awakening from the tenth century on' that has been labeled a 'commercial revolution'. In the tenth century, the amount of silver in circulation expanded greatly, even in the countryside, a change that probably both reflected and promoted increased trade. Scholars today question the frequently implicit Marxist assumption that nobles in the countryside and merchants in the cities, specialists in antithetical modes of production, were pitted against each other in a zero sum game: rather, rural landholders would naturally have sought advantageous relationships with the new markets; peasant farmers who could produce food for growing cities would prosper as would landlords who found ways to tap their profits. Although most trade was local, exotic products such as silks and spiccs are easier to document. The West in the tenth century benefitted from the relative prosperity of its Greek and Muslim neighbors. Rising tides float many boats.

A Tenth-Century Revival of the Latin Church?

The tenth century also witnessed a revival of the Latin Church. This is not clear in traditional histories that identify ecclesiastical reform with papal reform. Back in the tenth century, long before the Gregorian Reform party took the field, many initiatives were already underway: unparalleled donations of property to the Church; a great rebuilding of destroyed churches led by kings and nobles; monastic reform movements spearheaded by Cluny, Fleury, and Gorze; diocesan reconstruction led by wealthy and powerful bishops who were both temporal and spiritual leaders; and impressive regional programs such as the England's 'Benedictine Revival'. Today it is becoming increasingly common for scholars to treat the Gregorian Reform not as the beginning of ecclesiastical reform but as its culmination.

The development of schools was one aspect of this ecclesiastical activity. The late tenth century is said to have seen 'the take-off of western schools', a wave of new school foundations far surpassing the relatively few elite centers developed by Charlemagne's top-down court culture. If 'renaissance' is narrowly defined as a self-conscious revival of classical Latin literature, then late tenth-century schools earn the label. Tenth-century pedagogy showed increasing Italian influence, though it remained dominated by the Carolingian intellectual heartland (France, Burgundy, and the Lorraine) and by Carolingian ideals of scholarship. German schools proliferated and were often distinguished. England's 'monastic renaissance' featured learning both in Latin and in the vernacular. Today's scholars also study tenth-century 'creative forgetting', attempting to describe how schoolmen and laymen constructed 'useful' pasts and shaped their histories and archives to fit their goals. The tenth century's monastic and cathedral schools would come to dominate the educational revivals of the eleventh and early twelfth century, creating the milieu from which high medieval universities would ultimately arise.

A New Tenth-Century Europe

In the popular mind, the High Middle Ages is especially associated with the birth of the Ancien Régime, the political and social systems of kings, nobles, offices, courts, ceremonies, and laws that dominated European states up to the French and industrial revolutions and that still remained influential long afterwards. The tenth century, however, may not be the best place to start this story. Scholars who describe a 'feudal revolution' at its end are not claiming the rise of feudal monarchs but rather the triumph of disorderly nobles, castellans, and knights who would have created a culture of violence that would remain
untamed until the twelfth century or later, only after bewildered princes and kings finally got better organized and after lawyers had systematized feudal customs. Governments in the tenth and eleventh centuries did not yet possess the attributes of political cohesion — continuity in space and time, growing legitimacy and authority, claims to loyalty, the ability to guarantee justice and law through financial and juridical institutions staffed by professional bureaucratic personnel — that Joseph Strayer considered essential for the origins of the modern state. In the tenth century, insofar as government tamed chaos, it tended to succeed through elaborate public rituals, what German scholars have labeled 'rules of the game' (Spielregeln). This would be so for many centuries. Strayer was able to find emerging states in the twelfth century only because he accepted lordship as government. Scholars who insist on a 'normal conception' of political power 'rooted in practice and distinct from lordship' cannot find much to their liking prior to the spread of Aristotelian political theories in the thirteenth.

The tenth century, nevertheless, was important for today's map of Europe. The disintegration of politics ceased; recognizable prototypes of today's European nation-states emerged. France at the end of the tenth century exhibited 'increasing cohesion', an outcome not predictable at the century's start. German kings maintained the unity of East Francia and established a 'Roman' empire that officially lasted into the nineteenth century. England in the tenth century was transformed into a Carolingian successor state and developed a unified government more centralized than any since the departure of the Roman legions. Monarchical power in the tenth century may have actually benefitted a bit from foreign attacks inasmuch as kings in border regions such as England, Spain, and Germany had the greatest success in retaining control over their military elites. Especially impressive was state formation in northern and eastern Europe, where Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary adopted Latin ecclesiastical and governmental structures. These new states had bishops, kings who were crowned 'by the grace of God', legitimate heirs who were ecclesiastically defined, and military institutions increasingly like those of the core Frankish world. The ceremonial aspects of the Ancien Régime developed during the tenth century and become much more prominent in the sources. The tenth century turned late Carolingian experiments with coronation rites into standard procedures widely disseminated through sacramentaries and pontificals.

Another View: The Tenth Century as 'Francia II'

Another perspective on the tenth century, however, places more emphasis on its Carolingian roots. The Carolingian Empire had often been viewed as a dead end. Although Charlemagne himself was such a heroic figure that nationalist historians fought to co-opt him as a proto-French or proto-German king, his empire was far less fascinating because it was so ephemeral and so conceptually different from the nation states that would come to dominate Europe. Carolingian civilization seemed more a last feeble flower of Late Antiquity than the wave of the future.

The world wars of the twentieth century changed things. Competing nation states no longer appeared to be civilization's teleological goal, and, as the Common Market and other Pan-European institutions began to take shape, Charlemagne became acclaimed as 'the father of Europe'. The new interest even extended to the later Carolingians, despite their silly names (Charles the Bald, Charles the Fat, Louis the Stammerer, etc.). Simultaneously, the debates over Henri Pirenne's claim that a Roman Mediterranean had survived the fall of the Roman Empire led to a new
interest in early medieval economic development. The result? Many now claim that it was the Carolingian world that inaugurated Europe’s high medieval prosperity. According to the editors of a recent survey.

Not even a generation ago, scholars located around the year 1000 a series of crucial new directions in the development of European civilization: the demographic upturn after the late Roman decline, the spread of new agricultural techniques and productivity, the beginning of medieval trading centers and circuits, to name only them. All have now been detected closer to 800, or even 700.\textsuperscript{51}

Should we then place the medieval ‘take off’ in the eighth century rather than the tenth and see the tenth century as the unfolding of the Carolingian project? According to this periodization, the Franks revived Western Europe, and, once the barbarian invasions of the late ninth and early tenth centuries had ceased, Frankish civilization spread to an area twice as large as what Charlemagne had ruled and unleashed the dynamic growth cycle that came to characterize the High Middle Ages. To evaluate this model it is necessary to return to the indicators that allegedly marked the tenth century as a ‘new world’ and to examine in more detail their possible Carolingian antecedents.

\textit{Carolingian Agricultural Prosperity?}

What about the agricultural and demographic turn around? Even Lynn White Jr had been careful to note the Carolingian roots of the agricultural and technological innovations to which he attributed Europe’s resurgence – what he had claimed as distinctive was their more widespread diffusion at the start of the High Middle Ages. Subsequent research, incorporating much more archaeological data, reveals that Carolingian agriculture did already feature varying crop mixtures and systems of animal husbandry, ample use of iron in all sorts of farm tools, and many water mills (63 for the monastery of Saint-Wandrille in 787, 84 for St Germain-des-Prés ca. 825).\textsuperscript{52} In the eighth century, manors, often thought to have been static relics of Late Antiquity, were in some cases restructured to separate the lord’s fields (the desmesnes) from peasant holdings, a profound change presumably undertaken for economic and administrative benefits.\textsuperscript{53} Some scholars speculate that the decline of slavery began in Carolingian times and correlated with increased productivity, perhaps achieved in part by employing slaves to clear new land and then settling them in place as peasant farmers.\textsuperscript{54}

Population trends in the Carolingian world have been inferred from data provided by polypychs (inventories of estates held by large ecclesiastical institutions). Their testimony has to be carefully evaluated since only about a dozen survive, of which only four contain really detailed demographic information. From these, scholars documented pessimistic, no-growth scenarios, based upon anomalies such as depopulated areas, inefficient population clustering, odd gender and age ratios, and low crop yields. Now revisionists – postulating that the polypychs undercount women, children, and immigrants – use revised data to support scenarios of ‘moderate to considerable ... population growth’, perhaps interrupted by sporadic local crises.\textsuperscript{55} Questions can be raised about how well a handful of documents from a few mega-monasteries represents the whole Carolingian countryside, but support for population growth also comes from cemetery comparisions and pollen analyses (increased grain pollen from the seventh century onward suggests an increase in arable land).\textsuperscript{56}

Pirenne’s thesis discounted Carolingian towns and cities. As a result, even scholars of the caliber of Georges Duby had a hard time seeing them:
In the civilization of the ninth and tenth centuries the rural way of life was universal. Entire countries, like England and almost all the Germanic lands, were absolutely without towns. Elsewhere some towns existed: such as the few Roman cities in the south ... But except for some in Lombardy, these ‘towns’ appear as minute centres of population ... deeply immersed in the surrounding countryside. Indeed they could hardly be distinguished from it.57

Subsequent research refutes these claims. True, the Carolingian Empire was overwhelmingly rural, like every other civilization prior to the industrial revolution, but it did have active towns. Although villages and parish structures would not take their final forms until much later, their development would be facilitated by Carolingian capitularies systematizing tithes and establishing standards for rural churches. In some regions, archaeologists have found more evidence for nucleated settlements than dispersed homesteads and have suggested that, during the ‘long eighth century’ (c. 680–830), antecedent forms of medieval villages became widespread, both inside and outside of manorial structures.58 Widespread use of metal detectors now reveals networks of sites yielding clusters of lost coins, indicating that rural settlements had economic significance.59 Mid-level market towns apparently prospered from the late seventh through the early ninth centuries, and may underlie the later urban growth of the High Middle Ages.60 Major Carolingian emporia, though not always anchored in surrounding urban developments, were part of an expanding trade network.61 Old Roman cities, including Rome itself, grew thanks in part to the extensive rebuilding of churches promoted by Charlemagne and his successors.62

The revival of towns is also related to commerce. The efforts involved in compiling detailed polypychs for great ecclesiastical estates make sense only if a significant proportion of estate produce was actually sold.63 Workshop complexes associated with market towns crafted utilitarian items; those connected to monasteries and churches created high quality religious and luxury goods.64 References to tolls in Carolingian capitularies indicate that merchandise circulated.65 Tabulations of coin hoards, travel records, and relic attestations reveal that ‘Communications between the Frankish empire and the eastern Mediterranean world surged in the final decades of the eighth and the first decades of the ninth century’.66

An Afterlife for Carolingian Institutions?
The Frankish Church functioned as a department of government.67 The dominant theme, strongly promoted by the emperor as an instrument of imperial policy, was ‘to align the whole of Carolingian Europe to Rome’.68 This quest for unity has fascinated scholars, even though it can sometimes be rather limiting as a research perspective.69 The ‘Carolingian Renaissance’ has been faulted for its lack of originality, its dependence on the palace, and its extension to perhaps only a few hundred clerks, but it was an enthusiastically and consistently sponsored revival of learning. On a practical level it provided the foundation of texts, copyists, libraries, and schools that underlay Latin Europe’s subsequent cultural development. In the intellectual realm it established the Roman, Christian, and Merovingian sources for government, law, and culture. Its schools would shape tenth-century schools: Ottonian book production, for example, with relatively rare exceptions, does not deviate from the canon of authors the Carolingians established.70 Carolingian monastic reforms are now seen as directly ancestral to the practices of tenth-century monastic confederations such as Cluny.71 The Carolingian Renaissance has been hailed as the ‘first “renaissance”, without which no others would have been possible’.72
Sacral kingship in the Latin West built upon Carolingian models. The late ninth century created impressive coronation rituals by amalgamating the traditional secular acclamations of kings with the ecclesiastical anointings introduced by the Carolingians.  

It inaugurated formal coronation ceremonies for queens. Although Ottonian imperial ideals and concepts differed significantly, they remained deeply indebted to Carolingian precedents. In the words of Timothy Reuter (d. 2002), one of the more preeminent historians of Germany, ‘To put it at its simplest: they [the Carolingians] invented most of the forms of rulership practiced in pre-French Revolution Europe.’

Whereas Marc Bloch and the early Annales believed that a new military elite had arisen out of the chaos of the ninth and tenth centuries, careful study by German scholars reveals continuities between the Carolingian aristocracy and the ‘new nobility’ of the High Middle Ages. Regional studies for Alsace, the Middle Rhine, and Bavaria document not only how aristocratic families continued but also how the power of the Carolingians depended upon their ability to harness the power of local aristocratic factions. Courtly life can be found at Aachen, long before Bruno of Cologne and other Ottonian officials began to foster courtesy and chivalry. Even the ideals of crusade and holy war, which have been presented as tenth- and eleventh-century innovations leading up to the crusades, appear to have had Carolingian antecedents.

Conclusion

Although gross periodization is required by didactic expediency and the need for historical orientation, it always involves some degree of arbitrariness. This becomes clear when we watch scholars attempting to place the tenth century into the right intellectual niche. Part of the problem, of course, is that it was a liminal age, a time of transition. Its lack of any defining central leadership makes it difficult to grasp – no Charlemagne or Gregory VII helps to clarify leading issues and concerns. In fact, centralized structures of any kind are so few and inconsistent that the age’s most distinctive feature might be said to be regional fragmentation. In a world that consists of myriad of discrete units, diverse local events must be radically simplified in order to generalize about economic, social, or cultural change. Skeptics can challenge any claim by pointing to geographical outliers well ahead of or behind the curve.

Nevertheless, by examining the competing ways in which scholars have attempted to understand the tenth century, some clarity does emerge. For one thing, despite the tendency of the debaters to formulate opposing positions, much of what they have discovered is actually quite compatible. A Janus-like tenth century can simultaneously look backward to Late Antiquity and forward to the High Middle Ages. At its opening, Carolingian kings and pretenders were still influential and Western Europe was reeling from barbarian attacks; at its close, countrysides were more fortified, rebuilding and restructur- ing were well underway, and a more recognizable map of Europe had been created. Thus ample supporting evidence is potentially available both for models that stress the old and for those that stress the new. What is most striking is that all scholars formulate their interpretations in the light of the impending dynamism of the High Middle Ages. Where they differ is on exactly how the tenth century relates to that revival. Did it precede it? Start it? Or continue a growth cycle already in progress?

The current status of this debate is exemplified by The Long Morning of Medieval Europe (2008), a state-of-the-art book directly concerned with questions of historical periodization. Its authors champion a Carolingian take-off, stealing that honor away from the
tenth century: 'Many features that distinguish the full flowering of medieval civilization in the eleventh and later centuries had in fact begun to develop two or three hundred years earlier than previously perceived'. Not everyone is prepared to accept this back-dating, particularly not French scholars committed to a tenth-century 'feudal mutation' who grudgingly acknowledge the Carolingian world as 'an aborted Europe that nevertheless left behind a legacy' and who can dismiss the Carolingian economy as 'not a particularly interesting topic'. But even scholars who are willing to accept a Carolingian take-off as a provisional model will then be surprised to read: 'When did they [the Early Middle Ages] end? The easy answer is 1000 or at least the eleventh century. By then towns were growing smartly, new forms of art and culture were afoot, and feudalism was triumphing as a political and social force'. Are these distinctives defensible? It is disconcerting that the first two also apply to any of the surrounding centuries and that the third hinges on the 'f-word', for the use of which American medievalists can get their mouths washed out with soap. Whatever claims the editors may make for earlier Frankish achievements, they separate them from the High Middle Ages by adopting this break and restore the tenth century to its transitional role. Discussions about the place of the tenth century are far from over. It is now much less dark, but we still do not know exactly what to do with it.

Short Biography

John Howe studies the ecclesiastical and social history of tenth- through twelfth-century Europe and is now at work on a survey of The Revival of the Latin Church: The 'Pre-Gregorian' Reform. He is the author of Church Reform and Social Change in Eleventh-Century Central Italy: Dominic of Sora and His Patrons (1997, recipient of the American Catholic Historical Association’s John Gilmary Shea Prize in 1998) and editor (with Michael Wolfe) of Inventing Medieval Landscapes: Senses of Place in Western Europe (2002). His contributions to historical journals in many countries include hagiographical source criticism, inventories for the German Institute in Paris’s project on the Sources hagiographiques de la Gaule, studies highlighting ecclesiastical and social changes in central Italy, and historiographical reviews. He earned his doctoral degree from the University of California at Los Angeles (1979). He has taught medieval history at Texas Tech University since 1981, with breaks that include service as a Fellow of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton (2001) and as a Senior Research Associate at the Erasmus Institute at the University of Notre Dame (2003–2004).

Notes

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Re-Forging the ‘Age of Iron’: Part II


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41 Biscoe, Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 489–93.


45 H. Wolfram, ‘New Peoples around the Year 1000’, in P. Urban and (ed.), Europe around the Year 1000 (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, 2001), 391–408; M. Font, ‘Missions,
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43 On the spread of structures from Europe's core to its peripheries, see especially Bartlett, Making of Europe.

56 Verhult, Carolingian Economy, 26-27.
57 Duby, Rural Economy, 3.
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59 K. Uhlenkemper and T. Pestell, 'Introduction: Early Medieval Markets and "Productive" Sites', in Pestell and Uhlenkemper (eds.), Markets in Early Medieval Europe: Trading and Productive Sites, 650-830 (Macclesfield, Cheshire: Windgather Press, 2003), 1-14; present the history of research on loose coin finds, which has been pursued more systematically in the United Kingdom than on the Continent.


68 The quotation from McKitterick, Chalonsangers, 390, reflects general research tendencies. For example, Nistico del'Europa del'Age barbarico: Le escavazioni e le ricostruzioni, Atti del centenario di studi germanici e italiano di storia dell'alto Medioevo, vol. 27 (Spoleto: CISM, 1981) contains six contributions in its section on 'La Cultura', five of which invoke the quest for unity in their titles (vol. 1, 459-530; vol. 2, 531-818). See also McKitterick, Chalonsangers, 136 and 292-380.


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